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Abstract 
The ongoing global financial turmoil has increased the importance of understanding 
the potential spillover effects brought about by financial interlinkages. This article fo-
cuses on such interlinkages within Europe and potential contagion channeled through 
these interlinkages. It discusses the increased role of external financing as a source of 
funding for credit growth before the turmoil; analyzes potential channels of contagion 
through financial linkages; and assesses the magnitude of cross-border exposures between 
emerging and advanced European economies. Based on the stylized facts on these ex-
posures, the article provides indices of exposure to regional contagion that could help 
identify the likely pressure points and capture potential spillover effects and propagation 
channels of a regional shock originating from a given country. 
1. Introduction 
With the substantial increase in foreign ownership of the banking systems in 
Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (CESE), the  degree of financial inter-
linkages among Western European and CESE countries has grown markedly. Foreign 
ownership of CESE banking systems has brought important benefits to the  host 
countries, including advanced technology and risk management techniques and 
increased access to cross-border funding, and contributed to rapid financial deepen-
ing in CESE countries. At the same time, the rapid growth of financial links has also 
raised susceptibility to contagion for the host countries, as well as the home countries 
of the foreign banks active in many CESE countries. The ongoing global financial 
turmoil has increased the importance of capturing the potential spillover effects brought 
about by these financial interlinkages.   
A number of recent initiatives attempted to capture the growing interlinkages, 
particularly in Europe. Wajid et al. (2007) study financial links in the Nordic-Baltic 
region. Several recent financial sector stability assessments by the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank focus on cross-border exposures of domestic 
financial systems and regional feedback linkages, as well as on appropriate super-
visory policies to address the associated risks. The IMF’s Regional Economic Out-
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look — Europe (IMF, 2007 and 2008) discuss spillover effects as part of the ongoing 
efforts for regional surveillance of financial sector linkages. Maechler and Ong (2009) 
analyze the structure of bank claims and its potential implications for financial 
stability, both in the creditor and borrower countries of CESE. Geršl (2007) discusses 
the role of foreign banks and foreign lending in the Central and Eastern Europe from 
the financial stability perspective, analyzing the data on international banking busi-
ness to explore the risk of cross-border contagion. 
The present article analyzes the magnitude of cross-border financial exposures 
between advanced and emerging economies in Europe through banks with significant 
cross-border operations, and discusses the associated risks in the form of exposure to 
potential regional contagion. Based on consolidated international banking claims data 
from Bank for International Settlements (BIS) reporting banks, it explores the extent 
of financial interlinkages between home and host countries and provides stylized facts 
that could help assess the extent to which shocks from foreign markets can affect 
a given country. Combining the BIS data with those from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) and World Economic Outlook (WEO), and similarly to Sbra-
cia and Zaghini (2001) and Geršl (2007), it focuses on possible contagion through 
a “common lender” that may be present in a number of countries. It explores how 
the  presence of a  common lender could transfer a  shock in one country to other 
countries in the  region in which the  parent bank has significant direct or indirect 
operations.  
To this effect, it uses a similar approach to Sbracia and Zaghini (2001) to 
compute indices of exposure to regional contagion based on the  stylized facts 
provided by the  magnitude of the  interlinkages between Western European and 
CESE countries.
1 Under alternative assumptions about the common lender, trigger 
countries, and different measures of financial exposure, the indices attempt to gauge 
countries’ susceptibility to contagion originating from potential problems in another 
country in the region (be it a parent bank or its subsidiary). In general, high exposure 
to such contagion measured this way would require that: the common lender’s ex-
posure to the country initially affected by a problem is large (implying substantial 
losses, and in turn a need to retrench funding); that the same lender is a dominant 
player in the financial systems of other countries in the region; and that these other 
countries must not have significant additional sources of external funding readily 
available. 
The key findings are as follows: The financial interlinkages within Europe are 
economically significant. Most CESE economies are highly dependent on Western Eu-
ropean banks, either directly by their private sector or through the local banking sec-
tors, and the exposures are fairly concentrated. Austria, Germany, and Italy account for 
the largest share of bank claims on the CESE region as a whole (for the Baltics, mainly 
Sweden), though some CESE economies have relatively more diversified sources of 
funds. By contrast, the magnitude of Western European bank exposures to CESE is far 
smaller, except in the case of Austria and Sweden. Where the exposures to host coun-
tries are economically non-negligible, their concentration also raises concerns. Even 
where the  exposures are well diversified, potential economic and financial spill- 
-overs within CESE could bring the overall exposure to a more considerable magnitude. 
1 Further details on the stylized facts can be found in Árvai, Driessen, and Ötker-Robe (2009).  524                                    Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6 
The article also suggests that the larger the dependence of a CESE economy 
on flows from a  common lender and the  greater the  latter’s exposure to a  trigger 
country, the higher is its exposure to regional contagion. Austria, Italy, and Germany 
as common lenders have the largest effect in propagating shocks across a wide range 
of CESE countries. Susceptibility to regional contagion is the largest when the com-
mon lender has activities concentrated in the CESE region. And the larger the de-
pendence of a country on funds from home country banks, the higher is its contagion 
exposure. A broadly similar group of CESE countries appear to be more exposed to 
regional contagion than other CESE countries under alternative assumptions about 
the common lender, trigger countries, and different measures of financial exposure.  
The contagion exposure indices do not represent an assessment of the finan-
cial or macroeconomic vulnerability and stability of individual countries studied. 
Instead, they gauge their susceptibility to contagion originating from potential prob-
lems in another country in the region, and help identify the likely pressure points to 
capture potential spillover effects and propagation channels of a regional shock origi-
nating from a given country. The actual vulnerability of a country will depend on 
the country’s macroeconomic fundamentals, the capitalization, liquidity, and general 
soundness of the individual banking systems and its key institutions, the maturity 
structure of foreign claims on CESE countries, and the  nature of the  institutional 
regulations that affect financial relations between home and host institutions. In that 
sense, the indices should be seen as only one step in a full vulnerability exercise, 
which is beyond the scope of this article. 
The remaining parts of the article are organized as follows. Section 2 provides 
a brief background on the increased reliance of most CESE banking sectors on for-
eign funds to finance the rapid credit growth, and the risks associated with relying on 
concentrated foreign funding. Section 3 discusses possible channels of regional con-
tagion. Section 4 provides stylized facts on the magnitudes of cross-border exposures 
between CESE and Western European countries, which are used in Section  5 to 
compute indices of exposure to regional contagion. Section 6 provides concluding 
remarks. 
2. Background 
The banking sectors of CESE countries have gone through a profound trans-
formation since the second half of the 1990s. Foreign ownership levels are among 
the  highest in the  world (Figure 1), and bank credit to the  private sector has ex-
panded rapidly in recent years
2 (by about 23 percent a year on average in real terms 
across the region – see Enoch and Ötker-Robe, 2007).
3 While this phenomenon part-
ly reflected the process of catching up from low levels of financial intermediation, 
the fast convergence in credit ratios was mainly driven by similar business strategies 
of (mostly) Western European banking groups that dominate the banking sectors of 
2 See Arpa, Reininger, and Walko (2005); Backe, Égert, and Zumer (2006); Barisitz (2005); Cottarelli, Dell’-
Ariccia, and Vladkova-Hollar (2003); Duenwald, Gueorguiev, and Schaechter (2005); Enoch and Ötker-Robe 
(2007); Hilbers, Ötker-Robe, Pazarbasioglu, and Johnsen (2005); and Kiss, Nagy, and Vonnák (2006). 
3 The pace of credit growth has slowed in a number of countries in CESE during 2008 and 2009, following
the intensification of the global financial crisis and growing indications of a slowdown in economic acti-
vity. Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6                                             525 
Figure 1  Asset Share of Foreign-Owned Banks, 2000–06, in percent




































































Sources: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; IMF staff calculations 
 
Figure 2  Major Banking Groups Active in CESE, end-2007 
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Source: Annual reports; authors’ estimates for some smaller subsidiaries and branches. 
 
most CESE countries (Figure 2). These banks have been taking advantage of the op-
portunity to expand their presence in CESE banking systems, with such operations 
accounting for a substantial share of their profits (see Appendix I in Árvai, Driessen, 
and Ötker-Robe, 2009, for more details). 
With the brisk pace of private sector credit growth, dependence on non-de-
posit funding has increased in many countries in emerging Europe. Loan-to-deposit 
ratios (LTD) rose in most countries, particularly in the Baltics, where LTDs roughly 
doubled from the early 2000s, and in Ukraine, Hungary, and Russia, where they 
ranged from 120 to 150 percent in 2007. Except in a few cases (Moldova, Serbia, 
Macedonia, and Bosnia), the changes in the ratio of bank credit to gross domestic 
product (GDP) significantly exceeded those in the ratio of bank deposits-to-GDP, 
suggesting that deposit growth has not been able to keep up with the rapid credit 
growth in recent years (Figure 3).  526                                    Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6 
Figure 3  The CESE Region: Funding of Credit Expansion, 2003–2007 
(percentage points) 
                            
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; and authors’ calculations. 
 
The high and rising LTDs were associated with increasing reliance on foreign 
funding, channeled through the banking sector. This reflected the relatively under- 
developed state of domestic capital markets as a funding source in some of these coun-
tries, and easy access by the mostly foreign-owned banks to cheap funding from their 
parents.
4 Net foreign liabilities (NFL) as a ratio to private sector credit rose sharply 
from the  beginning of the  decade in many countries (most notably in the  Baltics, 
most of the South Eastern Europe, and Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine), although the ris-
ing trend has turned around more recently in a  few countries (Croatia, Hunga- 
ry, Serbia, and Slovakia).
5 Foreign funding through the banking sector has played 
a smaller role in Bosnia, the Czech Republic, Macedonia, Albania, Moldova, and Po-
land, although NFLs as a ratio to credit to the private sector have also been rapidly 
growing in some of these countries; by mid-2008, Albania, the Czech Republic, and 
Macedonia were the only countries with a negative ratio of NFL to bank credit. 
The differences in funding structures suggest that some countries are more 
exposed than others to financial market disturbances originating from advanced mar-
kets or to spillovers from problems in other countries in the region. Banking systems 
heavily dependent on foreign funding to support credit growth could face a sudden 
shortfall of, or costly access to, funds, and experience difficulties in expanding credit, 
if there were a sudden reassessment of exposure to a host country (e.g., due to con-
cerns about vulnerabilities in that country or the region).
6 While reputational risks 
and long-term business links may render it unlikely that parent banks would not sup-
port their subsidiaries, the degree of support depends on market conditions; as fund-
4 In a few cases (e.g., Latvia, Lithuania, and Hungary), the relatively high volume of money market instru-
ments and bond issuance by banks has provided some support for funding. In many cases, the business 
model of the banks (e.g., granting borrowers long-term foreign currency loans without long term financing
in foreign currency) made the increasing reliance on foreign funding particularly risky. 
5 This may be the result of a number of factors, including controls on foreign borrowing to contain credit 
growth and external imbalances (Croatia) or a weak macroeconomic environment (Hungary), or exchange
rate changes. 
6 Swedish banks, for instance, have reduced funding in the Baltics following a reassessment of their expo-
sures. Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6                                             527 
ing conditions in home countries become more difficult, banks may be pressured to 
slow lending and liquidity provision abroad and at home (as observed more recently). 
Parent liquidity or solvency problems could be transmitted to local banks in concen-
trated and largely foreign-owned banking systems. Banks can experience difficulties 
in lending if access to foreign syndicated funds is also curtailed, or due to delever-
aging across markets (also observed recently). 
The impact of such a credit crunch would be amplified if funding from other 
(nonbank) sources were also limited. Some emerging European countries that had 
been turning to international capital markets for funding in recent years have indeed 
seen demand for financial sector bonds drying up since the subprime crisis in August 
2007 (e.g., Eurobond issuance by the Russian and Ukrainian financial sectors) and 
some banks in CESE reportedly postponed their planned bond issues as a result of 
higher spreads. International bond issuance has been a negligible source of funding 
for most other countries in the region. Direct borrowing from abroad by the non-
financial private sector is also likely affected by a tightening of credit conditions in 
international markets.  
3. Possible Propagation Channels of Regional Shocks 
There are a number of channels through which a financial shock can be trans-
mitted between home and host countries. One channel through which financial con-
tagion could be transmitted is the presence of a “common lender” that may be the main 
funding source for several countries.
7 The private sectors of two countries in the region, 
A and B, for instance, may borrow mainly from the banking system of a third country, 
C (the common lender). A shock affecting A (e.g., due to a problem in a foreign-owned 
bank in A) may result in liquidity or solvency pressures in the banks of C, provided that 
the latter is highly exposed to A. The problems in A could then spillover to B, even 
when B’s economy is not directly linked to A’s, simply because of the presence of 
the third country, C, in both A and B. The parent bank’s presence in the region could 
therefore transfer a  shock in one country to other countries in the  region in which 
the parent bank has significant (direct or indirect) operations. Other parent banks ex-
posed to each of the affected host countries (directly or indirectly through their sub-
sidiaries) could in turn be affected, creating second-round effects. 
Similarly, a sudden reassessment of a parent bank’s exposure to a host coun-
try could expose its subsidiary to sudden liquidity problems.
8 Banks that are heavily 
dependent on parent bank funding to support credit growth could face a sudden short-
fall of, or costly access to, credit, if the parent bank either withdraws its deposits or 
lending to the subsidiary or charges a much higher interest rate on its funding. In 
banking systems that are heavily concentrated and where interbank market linkages 
are substantial, liquidity problems can spread to other domestic or foreign-owned 
banks, affecting in turn the parents of the latter and the banking systems in which 
the parent is active – again, generating second-round effects on other banking sys-
tems in the region.
9  
7 See Sbracia and Zaghini (2001) for a discussion of this channel of transmission of international shocks. 
Also, for a graphical summary, see Diagram 1 in Árvai, Driessen, and Ötker-Robe, 2009. 
8 For instance due to concerns about vulnerabilities in that country or a set of countries in the region. 
9 The same reasoning applies not only to foreign funding through the parent bank but also to host country 
bank borrowing through syndicated lending from a group of lender countries. 528                                    Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6 
Contagion could also go in the other direction, with host countries affected by 
problems in a parent bank. Liquidity or solvency problems experienced by a parent 
could spread to its subsidiaries or branches in other countries. Host country banking 
systems could be affected through a deterioration of confidence in the subsidiaries or 
branches and/or through direct funding exposure to the parent bank. A spillover to 
a host banking system could also be propagated through a change in the market’s risk 
assessment of a parent bank that belongs to a banking group with a deteriorated fi-
nancial standing. Other foreign banks that are exposed to the affected host banks 
could in turn experience problems, spreading their pressures onto those countries de-
pendent on funding from the affected parent banks.
10  
The magnitude of potential contagion effects through these channels depends 
in general on: (i) the size of the exposures of home banks (common lender) to the host 
country with a problem; and (ii) the dependence of the host country on funds from 
the home country. As pointed out in Sbracia and Zaghini (2001), three conditions 
must be satisfied for such channels of transmission to operate: (1) the common 
lender’s exposure to the country initially affected by a problem must be large, imply-
ing substantial losses, and in turn a need to restore capital; (2) the lender must be 
an  important source of funds for other countries; and (3) the  potentially affected 
countries must not have other sources of funding readily available. The following 
section provides stylized facts on these elements, to get a sense of the magnitude of 
the exposures between CESE and Western European countries so as to assess the sig-
nificance of these transmission channels for contagion. 
4. Stylized Facts on Cross Border Exposures and Financial Linkages 
To get a sense of the magnitudes of cross-border linkages between CESE and 
Western European countries, we use consolidated claims of BIS reporting banks on 
individual CESE countries. Foreign claims reported in the BIS international banking 
statistics include outstanding consolidated claims of the reporting banks on local bank-
ing systems, as well as claims on the nonbank sector (i.e., direct lending, which has 
increased in significance in recent years – for more details see Appendix II in Árvai, 
Driessen, and Ötker-Robe, 2009).
11 From the lenders’ perspective, the statistics pro-
vide the exposures of Western European countries to a given CESE economy. From 
the borrowers’ perspective, they give an idea of the magnitude and distribution of 
the dependence of CESE economies on Western European banking systems, and il-
lustrate the magnitude of control over a country’s assets and liabilities by foreign 
banks. They do not necessarily give an indication of exposure to potential funding 
risks through the banking sector.
12  
10 The importance of direct funding from European money markets by CESE subsidiaries of foreign banks
is generally small compared to parent bank and syndicated lending, since such direct funding is more ex-
pensive for the subsidiaries. Nevertheless, it is not negligible in some cases (e.g., in the Baltics). 
11 The BIS statistics differentiate between (a) cross-border claims, (b) local claims of foreign affiliates in 
foreign currency in a host country, (c) local claims of foreign affiliates in local currency, and (d) domestic
claims in the reporting country. In BIS terminology, (a) + (b) refers to “international claims,” while (a) +
+ (b) + (c) refers to “foreign claims.” That is, foreign claims include local claims of foreign-owned sub-
sidiaries in local currency which are, to a very large extent, financed by local deposits in local currency 
(see BIS, 2005 and 2008). Foreign claims correspond to the direct gross on-balance sheet exposure of for-
eign banks to individual countries, while international claims represent the level of foreign bank claims 
that could result in foreign exchange outflows. Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6                                             529 
Figure 4  Foreign Claims of All BIS Reporting Banks on Emerging Europe,  
December 2007
a
                Shares in Foreign Claims of All BIS Reporting Banks on Emerging Europe 






























 a BIS statistics do not provide detailed data on foreign claims on the private sector (e.g., to distinguish 
between corporates and households. Household sector direct borrowing from abroad is in general not 
significant. 
Sources: BIS Quarterly Review, June 2008, Table 9A (immediate borrower basis) and authors' calculations. 
 
The analyses of foreign claims show that most CESE economies are indeed 
heavily exposed to Western European banks, either directly by their private sector  
or through their local banking sectors.
13 Austria, Germany, and Italy account for 
the largest share of foreign claims for CESE countries as a whole, while non-Euro-
pean reporting banks hold less than 10 percent of the total claims on CESE (Fig- 
ure 4). The exposures are significant for many countries, both in relation to the re-
cipient countries’ GDP and the size of their banking system assets (Figure 5, upper 
panel). Outstanding foreign claims owed to reporting banks in all western European 
countries are substantial (at least 100 percent of GDP) for Croatia, Hungary, the Bal-
tics, and Slovakia. Exposures are also significant in terms of host country banking 
sector assets for many countries, but much less so for Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Al-
bania, Belarus, Moldova, and Macedonia.
14 Focusing only on international claims on 
12 Exposure to funding risk may be overestimated not only by the inclusion, in foreign claims, of the local 
claims of foreign affiliates in local currency, but also of direct foreign borrowing by CESE nonbank pri-
vate sector, since a large share of CESE companies borrowing directly from abroad are owned by large
foreign companies that can have access to other funding sources. The exposures have also been computed 
by using only international claims on banks, to have a better sense of the funding risk. 
13 This is even more so, given that BIS consolidated banking statistics do not include CESE-owned do-
mestic banks among the reporting banks. For instance, the Hungarian OTP Bank with no foreign strategic 
owner has subsidiaries in several CESE countries, accounting for a large share of their foreign liabilities, 
especially in Bulgaria and Montenegro. The same point applies to Slovenian and Greek banks some of which
have been very active in the region, but are not among the reporting or listed reporting banks, respectively, 
in BIS statistics. These figures are based on consolidated banking statistics in Table 9b of the BIS Inter-
national Banking Statistics, which do not include lending between head office and branches/subsidiaries,
with inter-office business netted out. The statistics also do not provide information on how the claims are 
funded: domestically (i.e., principally through deposits), or from abroad – including through loans from
the parent bank. 
14 The magnitudes of the exposures are also significant in relation to alternative economic and financial in-
dicators (e.g., current account balance, gross FDI inflows, or banking system capital), and for a similar set 
of countries, albeit with different rankings depending on the indicator used (not reported here).530                                    Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6 
Figure 5  Relative Magnitude of Exposure for CESE and Western Europe,  
December 2007 
 
Sources: BIS, International Banking Statistics, Table 9B, June 2008; IFS; WEO; authors' calculations.  
 
CESE banking systems also suggests heavy reliance of a number of CESE banks on 
external funding to support rapid expansion of lending to the private sector (Figure 6), 
in contrast to a number of others where local currency positions of reporting bank for-
eign offices make up a large share of the foreign claims (the Czech Republic, Slova-
kia, Bosnia, Poland, Albania).  
On the contrary, the magnitude of western European bank exposures to CESE 
is far smaller, compared with that of the  latter, with a  few exceptions (Figure 5, 
lower panel). For Austria, the  foreign claims of the  reporting banks on emerging 
Europe amounts to over 70 percent of Austria’s GDP and 26 percent of its banking 
system assets at end-2007. The exposures of banks in Belgium and Sweden are also 
relatively high in terms of their GDP (25 percent and 20 percent, respectively), but Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6                                             531 
Figure 6  CESE Banks' Exposure to Foreign Banks – International Claims on Banks,  
in percent of private sector credit and in percent of GDP 
             
Sources: BIS, International Banking Statistics; WEO; and authors’ calculations. 
 
much less so in terms of banking system assets (at most 10 percent). For the re-
maining countries, the exposures are negligible, including for France, Germany, and 
Italy with active presence in the CESE. 
These exposures could contribute to the potential vulnerabilities if their com-
position reflects heavy reliance on foreign funding and if the exposures are heavi- 
ly concentrated. Most CESE countries have concentrated exposures measured by 
foreign claims, particularly to banks in Austria and Italy as well as to France and 
Germany, and the Baltic countries have large exposures to Sweden (Table 1 in the ac-
companying Excel file on the web page of this journal). The same conclusion applies 
when exposures are measured by the reporting banks’ international claims on CESE 
(i.e., excluding the local claims of foreign owned subsidiaries in local currency) or by 
their international claims only on the CESE banks.
15  
Among the countries with higher foreign claims on their economies, some 
have relatively more diversified sources while others rely on a few sources. For ex-
ample, Czech Republic, Poland, and, to some extent, Hungary, have relatively di-
versified sources of funds. On the  other hand, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia have at least one third of their exposure to Austrian 
banks. Similarly, Italy accounts for 20–35 percent of the foreign claims on Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, and Slovakia, and the Baltic countries 
have at least about 60 percent of their total exposures to Sweden at the end of 2007. 
Such concentration of claims makes a large number of CESE countries heavily ex-
15 A  slight difference to note is that when bank-to-bank claims are used, Germany and Austria have
the greatest shares in the claims on many CESE countries’ banks, while with foreign and international claims,
Austria and Italy have the largest shares; nevertheless, Italy is still an important source. In addition, ex-
posures of Latvian banks (and to a smaller extent, Lithuanian banks) are concentrated on Germany, as well
as on Sweden. 532                                    Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6 
posed to potential adverse developments in the Austrian, Italian, and Swedish banks 
active in the region. 
Where the exposure to host countries is non-negligible economically, heavy 
concentration of the Western European exposures also gains importance (Table 2 in 
the accompanying Excel file on the web page of this journal). For example, the three 
Baltic countries together represent about 73 percent of Sweden’s exposure to all de-
veloping countries (about 20 percent and 10 percent of Sweden’s GDP and banking 
system assets, respectively, at end-2007). Such an  exposure would make Sweden 
vulnerable to adverse developments in any one of the Baltic countries, which could 
spill over to the other two economies. The exposures to CESE for other Western Euro-
pean countries are either well-diversified (e.g., Austria, Belgium), and/or the size of 
the absolute exposure is not economically significant (e.g., France, Germany, Italy, 
Portugal). 
However, even where the exposures seem well diversified across countries, 
potential economic and financial contagion may bring the overall exposure to a more 
considerable magnitude. For example, contrary to the case of Sweden, the exposures 
seem well diversified across several countries for Austria, which is highly exposed  
to the CESE region, and exposure to a single country seems relatively small (up to 
17 percent).
16 However, the ultimate impact of possible adverse developments in one 
country may be more significant, since problems in one country can spread to others 
and markets may not, at least initially, differentiate between countries based on eco-
nomic and financial vulnerabilities. Such spillovers could increase Austria’s vulnera-
bility to the region despite its diversified exposure. 
5. Implications for Exposure to Regional Contagion Risks 
What do the stylized facts on the exposures of Western and CESE countries 
say in terms of exposure to contagion risks? We explore two forms of contagion af-
fecting a CESE country: (i) exposure to a shock originating from the foreign bank’s 
home country, and (ii) exposure to regional contagion triggered by a problem in an-
other CESE country to which a Western European country has significant exposures. 
The stylized facts discussed above give an indication of both the borrowers’ liabili-
ties and the lenders’ exposures to these countries, and can help assess the relative 
exposures of the CESE countries to regional contagion. 
The first contagion channel involves a  shock transmitted from a  home to 
a host country, taking as trigger a country in Western Europe with active banks  
in the CESE region. In general, the larger a CESE country’s exposure to the trig- 
ger home country, the stronger would be the adverse effects from developments in 
the home country banks. The measure of absolute dependence, defined as the amount 
of claims owed to a home country as a share of the CESE country’s GDP (Table 3 in 
the accompanying Excel file on the web page of this journal) provides an indication 
of the extent to which a given CESE country will be affected. To illustrate, the table 
suggests that any potential adverse developments in Austrian (or Italian) banks would 
16 For example, while Austria makes up 36 percent of Croatia’s exposure to all reporting country banks in
end-2007, Croatia constitutes only 12 percent of Austria’s exposure to all developing countries. The larg-
est exposure of Austria is to the Czech Republic (17 percent), while the latter owes about 30 percent of all 
its foreign claims to Austria at end-2007. Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6                                             533 
Figure 7  The Impact of a Shock from Home to Host Country – An Illustration 
(Foreign claims owed relative to the recipient's GDP, in percent) 
  
 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
be felt most significantly in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slovakia; similar-
ly, any adverse developments in Swedish banks would be felt most strongly in Es-
tonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (see Figure 7 for an illustration).  
The second contagion channel analyzes how problems in one CESE country 
might spread to others in the region. One such mechanism is provided by the “com-
mon lender channel”, in which a Western European banking sector has a large ex-
posure to a trigger CESE country and is an important source of credit for other coun-
tries in the region. A shock affecting the trigger country may result in pressures in 
the banks of the common lender, given its high exposure to the trigger country, and 
could spill over to another CESE country, simply because of the large presence of 
the common lender in both countries. 
For this propagation channel, we follow an approach suggested in Sbracia and 
Zaghini (2001). Using BIS international banking statistics, the authors summarize 
the stylized facts discussed in Section 4 in the form of indices of exposure to the com-
mon lender channel of contagion for emerging market countries in Eastern Europe, 
Asia, and Western Hemisphere, where Germany, Japan, and the United States, re-
spectively, are assumed as the most common lenders. The indices attempt to evaluate 
contagion exposure in terms of dependence of each country on a common lender that 
is exposed to another country experiencing a problem. Since the calculation of such 
an index requires the knowledge of the trigger country, which can only be known ex- 
-post, an ex-ante indicator is computed, instead, using as trigger the country to which 
the common lender has the highest exposure. 
We adopt the Sbracia and Zaghini approach to the CESE countries with some 
variations (relating to the choice of the common lender and the trigger country), to 
compute indices of exposure to regional contagion. In particular, the following two 
indices have been computed:  
                                       CL
j
i
CL i AE ad I  
1                                                          (1) 





CL i REB AE ad I  
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where: 


















 – In (1),
i
CL ad  is the “absolute dependence” of country i on the common lender, de-
fined as foreign claims owed by country i to the common lender (CL)’s banks in 
country i's GDP (Table 3 in the accompanying Excel file). CL
j AE is the ex-ante 
“absolute exposure” of the  common lender to the  trigger country (the country 
with which it has the highest exposure). The absolute exposure of the common 
lender to country j (Table 4 in the accompanying Excel file on the web page of 
this journal) is defined as the ratio (in percentage terms) of the common lender’s 
claims vis-à-vis country j to its own funds (for the latter we use the common 
lender’s banking system assets). Both magnitudes are expressed in percentage 
terms. 
 – In (2), CL
i REB indicates some measure of rebalancing, that is, the amount of funds 
that may be cut from a borrower country i, following a problem in a trigger coun-
try the common lender has exposure to. It is defined as the amount of claims of 
the common lender on country i, CL
i A in ratio to the total amount of funds lent to 
all other developing countries, excluding the amount of claims on the trigger 
country. This ratio is an increasing function of the amount of funds that the com-
mon lender provides to country i and to the trigger country j.  
There is no single country that could be unambiguously identified as the u-
nique common lender for the CESE region (Table 1 in the accompanying Excel file 
on the web page of this journal). Many countries in the region are highly dependent 
on Austria, but others also depend on Italy and Germany; and the Baltic countries de-
pend predominantly on Sweden. The indices have therefore been computed under 
different assumptions for the common lender. In choosing the trigger country, we 
focused on 3  countries that the  common lender has the  largest exposures with- 
in the CESE group; as Table 4 in the accompanying Excel file on the web page of  
this journal suggests, the absolute exposures of the common lender(s) are not over-
whelmingly high with respect to any one of the recipient countries than the others 
in the group. Indices have been computed using both the foreign and international 
claims concepts, as well as international claims on banks only, to see how contagion 
exposures would change based on the nature of the home and host country links. 
Accordingly, the indices have been computed under several cases for the com-
mon lender and associated trigger countries. In particular, Austria, Italy, Sweden, and 
Germany have been chosen as the common lenders, and the three countries to which 
each common lender has the largest exposure among the other CESE countries have 
been chosen as the triggers. Figure 8 illustrates the indices for the foreign claims con-
cept for a selected group of common lenders: Austria, Italy, Sweden, and Germany. 
Figure 9 repeats the same exercise for the international claims concept.
17 
17
 In addition, Chart 13 in Árvai, Driessen, and Ötker-Robe (2009) illustrates exposures to regional conta-
gion when international claims only on the CESE banking sectors are used. The data are provided in the ac-
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Figure 8  CESE Countries: Indices of Contagion Exposure – Foreign Claim Concept 
Foreign claims on CESE countries – Common Lenders: Austria, Italy, Sweden, 
Germany 





a The figures illustrate the regional impact of a hypothetical shock to a country which each common 
lender has the largest absolute exposure to. 
Source: Authors’ computations based on BIS December 2007 data. 536                                    Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6 
Figure 9  CESE Countries: Indices of Contagion Exposure – International Claims 
Concept 
International claims on CESE countries – Common Lenders: Austria, Italy, Sweden, 
Germany  




a The figures illustrate the regional impact of a hypothetical shock to a country to which each common 
lender has the largest absolute exposure. 
Source: Authors’ computations based on BIS December 2007 data, more detailed bilateral data for interna-
tional claims provided by the BIS. Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6                                             537 
The indices provide some interesting results for the  degree of exposure of 
the CESE countries to regional contagion and their sensitivity to the source of con-
tagion: 
 – In general, the larger the dependence of a country on funds from home country 
banks (directly or indirectly through the domestic banking systems), and the larger 
the exposure of home country banks to the trigger country, the higher the values of 
the contagion indices. Taking into consideration the possibility of rebalancing in 
the common lender’s funding through a potential cutback in credit lines reduces 
the value of the index significantly (Index 2 vs. Index 1). The countries for which 
absolute dependence on foreign banks is lower drop out of the group of most ex-
posed countries under the second index. 
  – Contagion indices are the  highest when the  common lender has activities sub-
stantially concentrated in the region. In turn, the indices are smaller when the com-
mon lender has large presence in, but smaller exposure to, CESE in terms of its 
economic size, since in the latter case, the exposures to any country in the region 
are economically too small to affect the funds available to others when problems 
emerge in a  trigger country. Austria as the  common lender would hence have 
the highest effect in propagating shocks across a wide range of CESE countries.  
 – The indices also suggest that potential contagion between Sweden and the Baltic 
countries is highly concentrated. Although the Baltic countries exhibit the highest 
exposure indices for a hypothetical problem triggered in Estonia, Latvia, or Lithu-
ania, a potential spillover to the other CESE countries through the common lender 
channel seems to be contained within the Baltic region. This is because the de-
pendence of non-Baltic CESE countries on Sweden is immaterial, making the like-
lihood of any rebalancing effect rather small. Contagion from the Baltics to 
the rest of the CESE countries therefore seems to be fairly unlikely, at least based 
purely on the common lender channel.
18 Similarly, potential problems triggered in 
other CESE countries do not seem to impact the Baltic countries, except when 
Germany is the common lender. 
Using the  international claims concept produces lower contagion exposure 
indices (given the smaller magnitude of the exposures), but the group of countries 
relatively more exposed to regional contagion remains broadly the same (Figure 8). 
With significant foreign ownership of CESE banking systems, the foreign claims of 
the reporting banks, including local currency assets of foreign-owned affiliates, pro-
duce much higher indices than when international claims are used (the latter only 
include cross-border lending and foreign currency assets of foreign-owned affiliates). 
While the group of countries susceptible to regional contagion remains broadly 
the same, the ranking of countries within the group differs somewhat, in particular 
for Austria and Italy as common lenders, compared to Germany.
19 Indices based on 
international claims on CESE banks are even smaller in magnitude, but do not 
dramatically alter the group of the more exposed countries.
18 Psychological contagion, associated with a potential worsening of market sentiment against emerging
Europe in general, could, however, trigger a round of problems even though financial linkages across
the countries, directly or indirectly, may be small. 
19 This likely reflects the significantly higher share of cross-border claims in foreign claims for Germany 
than for Austria and Italy. Widespread and large subsidiary network of Austrian and Italian banks mag-
nifies and alters the order of the vulnerability ranking of many CESE countries. 538                                    Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6 
Although differences in magnitude of the  exposure indices across scenar- 
ios signal varying degrees of spillover effects among countries, the group of coun- 
tries most exposed to regional contagion remains broadly similar. The differences in 
the magnitude of the indices across different exposure concepts reflect the fact that 
international claims and claims on banks are a subset of the foreign claim concept, 
while differences across alternative triggers and common lenders reflect the differ-
ing sizes of financial exposures between home and host countries. Nevertheless, for 
the purposes of the article, what matters more is the information the indices contain 
in terms of the group of countries that appear as more exposed under various sce-
narios. The group of countries most exposed to regional contagion remains broadly 
similar regardless of the financial claims concept used, or assumptions about the com-
mon lender and trigger country. 
6. Conclusions  
This article has focused on the  cross-border financial interlinkages across 
Europe. It has explored the  channels through which financial contagion could be 
transmitted. Based on BIS country-level data on the outstanding foreign and inter-
national claims on a host economy as well as on international claims on host econo-
my banks, it assessed the  magnitude of home-host exposures and provided some 
stylized facts that subsequently fed into the  analyses of countries’ exposure to 
regional financial contagion. As one important channel through which such shocks 
could be transmitted, it has focused on the “common lender” channel and explored 
how the common lender could transfer a shock in one country to other countries in 
the region in which the parent bank has significant direct or indirect operations. 
The analysis supports the hypothesis that financial interlinkages within Eu-
rope are economically significant. The financial sectors of most CESE countries are 
dominated by institutions that belong to a limited number of financial groups with 
active presence in the region, some with significantly concentrated exposures. Most 
CESE countries are highly exposed to Western European banks, either directly by 
their private sector or through the local banking sectors. Austria, Germany, and Italy 
account for the largest share of these claims for the CESE region as a whole, though 
some CESE economies have relatively more diversified sources of funds. Where 
the  exposure to host countries is non-negligible, heavy concentration of the  ex-
posures, or even when the latter are diversified, potential economic and financial 
contagion within CESE could make the overall exposure much more sizeable. 
The contagion analysis offers the  following conclusions: The larger  the de-
pendence of a CESE country on funds from a regional common lender, the higher  
is its exposure to problems triggered in the common lender’s banks. Moreover, 
the larger the dependence on a common lender, and the greater the latter’s exposure 
to a trigger country, the higher is the susceptibility to regional contagion. Contagion 
indices are the  highest when the  common lender has activities substantially con-
centrated in the region, and are smaller when the common lender has large presence 
in, but smaller exposure to, the CESE in terms of its economic size. In the latter case, 
the  exposures to any country in the  region are economically too small to affect 
the funds available to others when problems emerge in a trigger country. A potential 
spillover of, for instance, Baltic-originated problems to the  other CESE countries Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6                                             539 
may hence be limited, at least based purely on the common lender channel, since 
Sweden’s small exposure to non-Baltic CESE makes the likelihood of any rebal-
ancing effect small.  
It is important to note that the contagion exposure indices computed here do 
not represent an  assessment of the  financial or macroeconomic vulnerability and 
stability of individual countries studied. While the group of countries most exposed 
to regional contagion remains broadly similar regardless of which financial claims 
concept is used, these indices only measure the degree to which shocks from foreign 
markets can affect a given country, and help identify the likely pressure points as-
sociated with a regional shock originating from a given country.  
The actual vulnerability of a country, on the other hand, will depend on 
a  number of other factors. These include the  capitalization, liquidity, and general 
soundness of the  individual banking systems and its key institutions, as well as 
the  country’s macroeconomic fundamentals. The  actual vulnerability will also be 
a  function of the  “true ability of the  common lender to rebalance,” which would 
depend, among other things, on the maturity structure of the common lender’s claims 
on the borrower, and the nature of the institutional regulations that affect financial 
relationships between home/host institutions, and hence the  liquidity of funds. 






















20 Availability of more detailed information would help improve the quality of analyses on exposures (e.g., 
on the maturity composition of the claims, amount and composition of funding of domestic subsidiaries
from their parents, with information provided on a bilateral basis. Some countries that appear most ex-
posed may turn out to be less so based on such information. For example, the much smaller share of short-
-term foreign claims in total foreign claims on a number of countries (e.g., less than 10 percent in the Czech
Republic and Poland) could reduce the degree of vulnerability to regional contagion.  540                                    Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6 
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